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The Labor Market Transformed: Adapting
Labor and Employment Law to the Rise
of the Contingent Work Force
Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt*
Since World War I, the American labor market has been transformed.
The U.S. economy has changed from predominantly a manufacturing
economy to predominantly a service economy 1 Women have entered the
paid labor market in record numbers, and women and African Americans
have enjoyed increased opportunity to enter professions from which they
previously were barred.2 Finally, the U.S. economy has become much more
integrated into an international economy in which its businesses and workers
are subject to intense international competition.3
An important facet of this transformation has been the recent increase
in the number of employees working in temporary, part-time, or subcon-
tracted positions. Probably no one has done more to document the recent
increase m this contingent labor force than Dr. Richard S. Belous.4 As Dr.
* Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin-Madison; on leave from Indiana
University-Bloomington. B.A. 1978, University of Wisconsin; M.A. 1981, J.D. 1981, Ph.D.
(Economics) 1984, University of Michigan. I would like to thank Professor David Millon,
Dean Mark Grunewald, and the editors of the Washington and Lee Law Review for inviting
me to write this comment. I also would like to thank Rebecca Salawdeh for useful research
assistance on this topic.
1. RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN "LABOR ECONOMICS:
THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY27 (4th ed. 1991).
2. See id. at 24 (noting dramatic increase in labor force participation rates for
women).
3. Id. at 126-27
4. See generally Richard S. Belous, How Human Resource Systems Adjust to the Shift
Toward Contingent Workers, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Mar. 1989, at 7; Richard S. Belous,
Human Resource Flexibility and Equity: Difficult Questions for Business, Labor, and
Government, J. LAB. RES., Winter 1989, at 67; Richard S. Belous, Flexible Employment: The
Employer's Point of View, in BRIDGES TO RETIREMENT: OLDER WORKERS IN A CHANGING
LABOR MARKET 111 (Peter B. Doeringer ed., 1990).
52 WASH. & LEE L. REV 879 (1995)
Belous points out in his current work, by 1993, between 25% and 30% of
the American labor force were contingent workers, and the contingent work
force was growing considerably faster than the rest of the work force with
between 40% and 55% of the jobs created between 1980 and 1993 going
to contingent workers.' Although contingent employment has increased
within every demographic group and within almost all sectors of the econ-
omy, as Dr. Belous observes, contingent workers are disproportionately
female, disproportionately Afican-American, and disproportionately
service industry workers.6
Although our regulation of the employment relationship in the U.S.
has kept pace, in some instances, with the transformation of the U.S.
economy, 7 and, in some cases, even prompted the transformation' as Dr.
Belous has documented in his article, our regulation of the employ-
ment relationship has not kept pace with the rise of contingent workers.
Contingent workers often are excluded explicitly from the defintion
of "employees" covered by protective legislation. For example, sub-
contractors typically are excluded from coverage under workers' compensa-
tion statutes, unemployment insurance statutes, and the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA).9 Even when contingent employees are included
among those "employees" governed by protective legislation, the nature
of their employment relationship often proves a barrier to the receipt
of protection or benefits under these acts. For example, temporary
workers are less likely to meet statutory recency or vesting requirements 0
5. Richard S. Belous, The Rise of the Contingent Work Force: The Key Challenges and
Opportunities, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV 863, 867 (1995).
6. Id. at 869-70.
7 For example, although perhaps overdue, the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
§§ 1-404, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (Supp. V 1993), is a recent response to the growing
number of women in the paid work force and the corresponding increase in the number of
two-earner families.
8. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988)
(requiring equal employment opportunities).
9. For example, see the definition of "employee" in the Massachusetts Workers'
Compensation Act, MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 1(4) (West 1994), the California
Unemployment Insurance Code, CAL. UNEMP INS. CODE § 621 (West 1986), and the
National Labor Relations Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988).
10. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-504, 1101-1109, 1321-1324 (1988) (outlining recency
requirements for unemployment insurance benefits); 42 U.S.C. §§ 420-433 (1988) (listing
recency requirements for Social Security disability benefits); and Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) § 203, 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1988) (outlining vesting
requirements).
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and, thus, are less likely to qualify for such benefits as unemployment
insurance, Social Security disability payments, and pensions." As -Dr.
Belous's article demonstrates, contingent workers also are less likely to
receive benefits such as health insurance and pensions, which have been
left largely to private voluntary provision under our system of regulation.'2
As Dr. Belous has noted, although the rise of contingent employment
has made the U.S. labor market more flexible in terms of the number
of hours of work that employees supply and employers purchase, our
social welfare system of regulatory protection, government benefits,
and private benefits has not achieved similar flexibility in covering
contingent workers. 3
I agree with Dr. Belous that the solution to this problem is not to
restrict or discourage contingent employment, but instead to try to adapt
our social welfare system to better meet the needs of contingent workers.14
In this essay, I hope to elaborate on Dr. Belous's arguments in favor
of extending our social welfare system to contingent workers. I accept
his basic argument that contingent workers need the protections and
benefits of our social welfare system as much, or even more, than core
employees.15 However, I would argue also that, by failing to extend
regulatory protection to contingent workers, our laws create artificial
incentives for employers to employ more contingent workers, needlessly
exposing employees to the risks of unemployment and denying them
valuable training. I also will discuss the issues that must be addressed to
extend our social welfare system to contingent workers. Dr. Belous's
article provides some tantalizing insights in flus regard when he discusses
multi-employer benefit schemes and the promotion of defined-contribution
pension plans.16 However, I would like to discuss further three key issues
in flus enterprise: the definition of "employee" used to define the scope
of our protective legislation, the portability of employee benefit plans
from one employer to another, and the provision to contingent workers
of benefits that are proportionate to those benefits provided to core
workers.
11. See Mary E. O'Connell, On the Fringe: Rethinking the Link Between Wages and
Benefits, 67 TUL. L. REv 1421, 1455-56, 1461 (1993).
12. Belous, supra note 5, at 875 tbl. 6, 877 tbl. 7
13. Id. at 876.
14. Id.
15. See id. at 873-78.
16. Id. at 877-78.
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L Including Contingent Workers in the American Social Welfare System
Dr. Belous joms Professor Mary E. O'Connell on tius panel in arguing
that our social welfare system should be extended to contingent workers
for the benefit of those workers.17 Just as core employees need the
protection of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) regula-
tions and the NLRA and the benefits of workers' compensation, unemploy-
ment compensation, Social Security, pensions, and health insurance, so
do contingent workers. Indeed, it can be argued persuasively that
contingent workers need such protections even more than core workers
because their employers have less long-term interest in their health
and safety and because contingent workers are more subject to the
whim of their employers and the fluctuations of the labor market."
I agree with these arguments, but would also argue that it is desir-
able to extend our system of regulation and benefits to contingent
workers to prevent our regulatory system from encouraging more
contingent employment than would otherwise be desirable. The regu-
lation of the workplace and workplace benefits, whether that regulation
is provided by OSHA, the NLRA, workers' compensation, unemploy-
ment compensation, or whatever, imposes costs on employers. If we
impose these costs on employers only for core workers and not for
contingent workers, this obviously creates incentives for employers to
employ more contingent workers than they otherwise would employ
Although contingent employment can provide desired job flexibility for
some workers (for example, those actively engaged in child rearing), as
Dr. Belous has established, 9 contingent employment has a variety of
undesirable characteristics, including low wages and benefits, greater
risk of unemployment from fluctuations in the labor market, and low
investment in human capital. Accordingly, I do not believe that it is
desirable to have government policy actively promote contingent employ-
ment, either intentionally or unintentionally
However, the extension of our social welfare system to contingent
workers will not be an easy matter. There are a variety of issues and
problems that must be addressed. Chief among these issues, I believe,
are the definition of "employee" used to define the scope of our protec-
17 Id. at 876-78; Mary E. O'Connell, Contingent Lives: The Economic Insecurity of
Contingent Workers, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV 889 (1995).
18. See O'Connell, supra note 11, at 1476-77
19 Belous, supra note 5, at 879
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tive legislation, the portability of employee benefits from one employer
to another employer, and whether or how to provide contingent
workers with benefits proportionate to those benefits provided to core
employees.
A. The Definition of "Employee" Time to Revisit the
Hearst Publications Definition?
Under our social welfare system, the receipt of statutory protection or
benefits is dependent on a person meeting the definition of "employee"
under the relevant statute. For example, section 2(3) of the NLRA defines
which persons are "employees" under that Act and, therefore, entitled to
its protections.2" Similarly, OSHA, state workers' compensation laws,
unemployment compensation laws, and other protective legislation limit the
scope of their protection with their defimtions of "employee."21 The
problem is that, invariably, the defimtion of "employee" under these
statutes excludes certain contingent workers. For example, all of the
statutes above exclude subcontractors from the definition of "employee."'
Moreover, even if a contingent worker is an "employee" of someone under
the relevant statute, that person may not be the one ultimately responsible
for the problem addressed by the protective legislation.
An example of this problem has cropped up in the enforcement of
OSHA regulations concerning exposure to toxic chemicals. 3 Suppose that
a major manufacturer suffers a spill of a dangerous chemical during the
manufacturing process. It may be cheaper for the manufacturer to
subcontract the clean-up work rather than maintain core employees to do
such work because such work is intermittent and the subcontractor may
have special expertise or equipment to handle such spills. Unfortunately,
it also may be cheaper to subcontract such work because the subcontractor
does not follow existing OSHA regulations, exposes his or her workers to
dangerous levels of the chemical, and is under-capitalized so that future
OSHA liability is not a concern. Workers' compensation liability also will
20. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)
(1988).
21. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA) § 3(6), 29 U.S.C. § 652(6)
(1988); see also supra note 9.
22. See supra notes 9 and 10 and accompanying text.
23. I would like to thank Mark Rothstem and Lance Liebman for this example. MARK
A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT LAw 742-43
(3d ed. 1994).
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not provide adequate incentives for the subcontracting employer to act
responsibly because workers' compensation is not fully compensatory and
no system that I know of is truly, fully expenence-rated.24
If a disaster occurs, for example, and several subcontracted clean-up
workers die from exposure to the chemical during the clean-up process, and
the under-capitalized subcontractor disappears, what will be the responsibil-
ity of the manufacturer for the death of the workers under OSHA? The
answer is "none." Although the manufacturer created the spill, the sub-
contracted employees are not its employees under OSHA, and the
manufacturer did not "expose" them to the hazard because it was the
subcontractor who brought the workers to the manufacturer's plant and
asked them to clean up the spill. Again, workers' compensation would not
remedy the problem because the subcontracting employees would not be the
employees of the manufacturer under the workers' compensation statutes.
This state of affairs encourages irresponsibility because irresponsible
subcontractors always can deal with a toxic spill most cheaply and they
afford the manufacturer immunity from OSHA and workers' compensation
liability
To solve this problem and the other definitional problems contingent
employees suffer, we need a definition of "employee" m our protective
legislation that includes temporary and part-time employees and that looks
at the actual relationships of responsibility and dependency between the
parties, m light of the purpose of the particular protective statute, to include
appropriate subcontracting employees whether or not they directly
subcontract from the principal manufacturer or are the employees of a
subcontracting employer. The form and rationale for such a definition
might follow those set forth in the old "economic facts" test developed
under the NLRA in the Hearst Publications case.' There the Supreme
Court held that where the "economic facts" of two parties' relationship
brought them within the purpose of the Act, the parties would be consid-
ered employer and employee even if the traditional "right of control" test
would classify the parties as principal and independent contractor.26 This
24. A workers' compensation system is "experience-rated" if the employers' insurance
charges under the system depend on the amount of their claims (or their "experience") under
the system. A workers' compensation system is "fully experience-rated" only if the
employers' insurance charges fully reflect all, and only, those costs attributable to their
respective claims.
25. See NLRB v Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 129 (1944).
26. See id.
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"economic facts" test was overruled by Congress with the passage of the
Taft-Hartley Act,27 but I would argue that it is time to legislatively revisit
this issue not only with respect to the NLRA but also with respect to other
protective legislation. At the very least, principal manufacturers must be
made jointly liable for the health and safety violations of their subcontrac-
tors under OSHA. This will give principal manufacturers incentive to
ensure that they hire only responsible subcontractors that are properly
capitalized.
It should be noted that this expanded definition of "employee" would
not be all bad for employers. Under workers' compensation statutes, the
definition of "employee" is a two-edged sword. Workers' compensation
statutes provide compensation benefits to people covered by the definition
of "employee," but also provide tort immunity to manufacturers for injuries
to those people covered by the definition. Accordingly, although principal
manufacturers might incur greater OSHA liability and workers' compensa-
tion liability for contingent workers under this broadened definition, they
would also receive immunity from tort suits by these contingent workers for
injuries that occur m furtherance of the principal manufacturers' interests.
Such tort liability for injuries to subcontractors and the employees of
subcontractors has been a growing problem for American manufacturers.2"
B. The Portability of Employee Benefits
Contingent workers, or at least those whose employment is temporary
in nature, lose out on the benefits of our social welfare system because
statutes and private employment rules prevent employees from carrying
credits for hours of employment and benefits from one job to the next. For
example, temporary employees are less likely to meet nummum require-
ments for recent work under state unemployment insurance plans or the
Social Security Disability Act and, thus, are more likely to be denied
benefits under those laws despite significant past employment. 29 Similarly,
temporary workers are less likely to meet waiting periods or vesting
periods for private benefits and, therefore, are less likely to qualify for
private benefits such as sick leave, vacation time, and pensions. Thus,
27 Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)
(1988).
28. See ROTHsTEiN & LiEBMAN, supra note 23, at 850-51 (describing tort actions
against third parties).
29. O'Connell, supra note 11, at 1460-61.
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temporary employees can be denied state and private employment benefits
despite a history of significant past employment due to the intermttency of
that employment.
Government policy can seek to reduce tis problem through a number
of means. First, federal and state governments can amend their own laws
to reduce recency requirements for Social Security disability benefits,
unemployment insurance, and other statutorily provided benefits. Second,
states or the federal government could enact laws encouraging or requiring
shorter waiting and vesting periods for private benefits. The most obvious
candidate for this strategy is the five-year maximum vesting requirement
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).3° Finally,
as Dr. Belous suggests, the federal government could enact legislation
encouraging the use of defined-contribution pension plans with quick or
immediate vesting rather than defined-benefit pension plans. "Defined-
contribution plans," in which the employer makes specified contributions
to an account in each employee's name each pay period, have tremendous
advantages in portability over the more traditional "defined-benefit plans,"
in which a specified number of years of service entitles the employee to
some percent of his or her average annual income as a pension upon
retirement. The personal retirement accounts associated with defined-
contribution plans are much more amenable to multi-employer contributions
and portability with the employee from job to job than the years of service
credits earned under defined-benefit plans.
These changes will, of course, raise the costs of government and
private benefits by raising utilization and admumstrative costs. However,
society will be more than compensated for these costs by the extension of
these employment benefits to contingent workers.
C. The Provision of Proportional Benefits to Contingent Workers
The final, and perhaps the most controversial, issue that must be
addressed in the extension of our social welfare system to contingent
workers is the issue of proportionality in the delivery of social welfare
benefits. As Dr. Belous's statistics show, contingent workers are entitled
to receive far fewer private benefits from their employers than correspond-
ing core employees. 31 The most obvious examples of this deficiency are
30. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) § 203, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1053 (1988).
31. Belous, supra note 5, at 875 tbl. 6, 877 tbl. 7
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health and pension benefits, but there are other examples, including sick
leave, vacation days, and disability benefits. One could argue that
contingent workers receive fewer of these benefits merely because their
productivity and, thus, their bargaining power are lower than core
employees. Requirng employers to provide proportionate benefits to such
workers would be akin to increasing the minmum wage for such workers
and may discourage their employment.32 On the other hand, to the extent
that society is not willing to allow contingent workers to go without
minimal health care and retirement benefits, the cost of such benefits
merely is transferred to society at large when those benefits are not
provided by the private sector. It is beyond the scope of this comment to
say precisely how society should address this problem, whether through
encouraging or requiring greater private benefits or through expanding
current government programs. However, it seems appropriate to point out
that the development of a rational national health insurance policy and the
maintenance of a mandatory retirement income system, such as Social
Security, are important steps in addressing these problems.33
IL. Conclusion
Dr. Belous has produced a very useful empirical study of the
contingent work force. In that study he has documented the following: the
recent and continuing growth of tis work force as a percentage of the total
work force, the composition of the contingent work force and the variety
of jobs that contingent workers do, and the disadvantages that contingent
workers suffer relative to core workers in employment stability and the
acquisition of employment benefits. Dr. Belous's study establishes the rise
of the contingent work force as an important phenomenon in the continuing
postwar transformation of the American economy and as a phenomenon to
which our laws governing the employment relationship must be adapted.
32. Recent empirical work on the employment effects of the mimmum wage calls this
conclusion into doubt. See generally David Card, Using Regional Variation in Wages to
Measure the Effects of the Federal Minimum Wage, INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV., Oct. 1992,
at 22.
33. One proposal for ensuring retirement income that I find intriguing is to require
employers and employees to contribute an equal share of an employee's pay, say 2.5 %, to
a tax-free individual retirement account that could be invested as the employee sees fit. This
money could serve as a supplement to the Social Security system, would be retained as a
guarantee of at least some retirement income regardless of the performance of financial
markets, and would have the advantage of increasing the country's saving rate. JOHN H.
LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAw 67 (1990).
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The question that is left for practitioners, legal scholars, and policymakers
such as those present at this conference is how best to adapt our labor and
employment law to the needs of the burgeoning contingent work force.
